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Habitat for Humanity (HFH) built, rehabilitated or repaired homes for 25,000 
families in Indonesia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and India in the five years following the 
Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004.  This represents 7% of the total housing need of 
approximately 440,000 houses across the four countries (International Recovery 
Platform 2011).  In response to one of the worst natural disasters in recent history 
HFH’s approach emphasised: 
 community-based strategies involving local people in decision making;  
 encouraging families to rebuild their homes in-situ;  
 a preference for a simple core house design that could be extended later;  
 working with partners to reach more families;  
 a focus on the poorest and most vulnerable families;  
 mobilizing HFH’s network of volunteers to assist; and  
 assisting others in need in neighbouring areas who had not been directly affected 
by the tsunami and those likely to be affected by future natural disasters (Habitat 
for Humanity 2009). 
In 2009 HFH commissioned Arup International Development (Arup ID) to carry out 
an assessment of its housing reconstruction programmes in India, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand and Indonesia after the tsunami based on their previous experience in post-
disaster reconstruction (Da Silva 2010; Batchelor & da Silva 2010).  The purpose of 
this assessment was to investigate the extent to which HFH’s housing reconstruction 
programmes had contributed to the development of sustainable communities and 
livelihoods (Chambers & Conway 1992; DFID 1999); namely their contribution to 
increased human, social, physical, economic and environmental assets as well as 
more enabling institutional structures and processes.    
This paper describes the methodology for undertaking the assessment.  It then 
describes common strengths and weaknesses of the programmes evaluated in terms 
of houses and settlements as ‘products’ (or outputs), as well as the process of housing 
construction through engagement with households, communities, governments and 
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other actors.  In conclusion the authors reflect on the findings from the assessment, 
highlight key strengths and recommend areas for improvement in future programmes. 
2. Methodology 
This research was completed between November 2009 and March 2010; roughly five 
years after the disaster and less than three years after the completion of construction.  
The assessment was based on programme documentation provided by country offices 
and one week of fieldwork per country which included: key informant interviews; 
workshops with HFH personnel; visual observation of four or five communities; 
participatory workshops using standard Participatory Rapid Appraisal (PRA) 
techniques; and completion of questionnaires by 30 households.  This provided a 
range of quantitative and qualitative data on which to base the assessment. 
The data was analysed using the ASPIRE tool Arup ID had developed previously 
with Engineers Against Poverty (2009a).  This tool provides a holistic appraisal 
framework which generates a qualitative assessment based on 96 indicators under 
four key dimensions.  Three of ASPIRE’s dimensions (society, environment and 
economics) incorporate the human, social, natural and financial assets from DFID’s 
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (DFID 1999) ‘assuming that the fifth dimension 
of physical assets is the project itself’ (Arup & Engineers against Poverty 2009b).  
The fourth key dimension (institutions) assesses the project’s relationship with and 
contribution to the development of enabling institutions, organisations, policies and 
legislation – the ‘transforming structures and processes’ aspects of DFID’s 
Sustainable Livelihoods approach. 
Arup ID one assessment for each country (Arup 2010a; Arup 2010b; Arup 2010c; 
Arup 2010d) and a fifth assessment covering all four countries (Arup 2010e).  This 
enabled comparison of both the outcomes of the four programmes and how these 
varied as a result of different approaches and contextual issues.  The results of Arup 
ID’s assessments fed into HFH’s broader organisational and learning review of their 
tsunami-response programme in 2009-10.  In writing this paper the authors have also 
returned to the original data to review the key findings and broader themes emerging 
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from the assessment.  Thus the findings presented below both reinforce the initial 
assessment and add additional insights where these have been identified through the 
review process. 
3. Housing as a product 
3.1 Site selection and settlement planning 
All of HFH’s programmes after the tsunami had a strong focus on in-situ housing 
reconstruction which meant that households maintained access to existing social 
networks, employment opportunities and social infrastructure such as schools, health 
centres, places of worship, community meeting places etc. (where these had not been 
destroyed by the tsunami).  However, responsibility for reinstating social 
infrastructure typically resided with government or other humanitarian organisations 
so this produced varying levels of service.   
While in-situ reconstruction had many benefits to communities it also meant that 
they remained in coastal locations vulnerable to flooding, storm surges and cyclones.  
Although HFH engaged with the whole community as part of the process of housing 
reconstruction its approach to the built environment focused on the reconstruction of 
individual houses: for example HFH’s programmes sometimes included the 
provision of community facilities (such as schools) but rarely included settlement 
level infrastructure such as roads or storm water drainage.  The assessment found 
that lack of consideration to hazard assessment, settlement planning and 
infrastructure at a settlement level was a significant contributing factor to continued 
levels of risk within the communities.  Households interviewed in all four countries 
continued to feel at risk from flooding (this varied from 28% in Thailand to 79% in 
Sri Lanka) with several households in Indonesia reporting that they had already 
experienced flooding within their new houses one or more times a year. 
Despite the focus on in-situ reconstruction, resettlement programmes did occur in all 
four countries.  This was particularly rare in Thailand and Indonesia but a necessary 
reality in India and Sri Lanka after the governments introduced ‘buffer zones’ – 
minimum distances from the coastline within which houses and communities could 
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not be reinstated.  Relocated communities were less vulnerable to natural hazards; 
with community members stating that they felt safer as they were at a greater 
distance from the sea.  However, relocated communities in India and Sri Lanka 
reported reduced access to education and employment opportunities as well as less 
community cohesion. 
Figure 1: Flooded houses in Indonesia at the time of the assessment 
 
HFH worked pragmatically to resolve land tenure issues in all four countries, but 
different policy environments meant this had mixed levels of success.  In Indonesia 
HFH supported communities in community-driven tenure adjudication through the 
government Reconstruction of Aceh Land Administration System (RALAS) 
programme, while (at the time of the assessment) land tenure for relocation 
communities in India and Sri Lanka was yet to be clearly resolved.  HFH’s tsunami-
response programme in Thailand worked with Muslim and Morgan (nomadic sea-
based) communities – both of which are minority groups in Thailand.  In several 
communities where land ownership was unclear HFH Thailand worked with local 
government to gain security of tenure for households before beginning construction 
of houses; enabling them to build permanent housing and invest in their homes. 
3.2 House design and construction 
HFH programmes in all four countries provided a simple single-storey core home 
which could later be extended (see Figure 2).  Core homes in Sri Lanka and India 
were smaller (around 30m2) and contained two rooms (a living room and a bedroom) 
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while core homes in Thailand and Indonesia were larger (40-45m2) and typically 
included a living room with one or two bedrooms.  Households interviewed were 
generally satisfied with the size of their core homes, but HFH had not included space 
or facilities for cooking; leaving more than 50% of households dissatisfied with this 
aspect of the design.  In India, Indonesia and Thailand 45-60% of households had 
already extended their houses at the time of the assessment (only 28% in Sri Lanka) 
while more than 60% of households planned to do so in the future.  In India and Sri 
Lanka many households had changed their room layouts and converted the smaller 
rooms into pujas (worship areas) or kitchens, while in Indonesia the majority of 
extensions were to accommodate a large kitchen suitable for entertaining guests.  
While this provides positive evidence that HFH’s core home design enabled people 
to easily adapt or extend their houses, so many extensions or alterations being 
undertaken for the same purpose, less than three years after completion of the core 
home, may also indicate that families were making these changes out of necessity 
because of limitations in the original core home design. 
Figure 2: Typical core home designs 
  






Core homes were typically masonry construction with a flat (India) or pitched roof 
with tiles or metal sheeting.  HFH Indonesia introduced concrete block construction 
(a new technology in Aceh) and established its own block production facility. This 
significantly increased the speed of construction and reduced both cost and local 
environmental impact (as local timber was not used for burning bricks).  Although 
communities initially did not believe that concrete blocks were suitable for housing, 
HFH staff reported that once the blocks had been proven they were well accepted.  
However, despite concrete blocks continuing to be manufactured by local suppliers 
after the completion of the programme, the majority of extensions had been 
completed in timber or bricks and where extensions had been completed in masonry 
they did not include the key seismic details included in HFH’s core home designs 
(see Figure 3).  HFH’s core home designs in Thailand were based on small 
improvements to traditional housing typologies; for example where people had 
traditionally lived in timber houses on stilts HFH introduced concrete stilts and 
concrete board cladding (which can be used like timber).  Thus, while the overall 
quality of core homes provided by HFH in Thailand was less than in other countries 
(for example concrete board cladding is less robust than masonry) the construction 
materials and techniques were closer to the vernacular and families found it easier to 
maintain and adapt their houses using similar techniques. 
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Figure 3: HFH’s core home design (far right) in one community in Indonesia which 
incorporates the re-use of a timber transitional shelter as a kitchen (right) and later extensions 
using a combination of timber and other materials (centre and left). 
 
 
Although physical disaster risk reduction measures at a settlement level were not 
typically part of HFH’s tsunami-response programme, house by house hazard 
assessment and mitigation was undertaken.  Typical disaster risk reduction aspects of 
HFH core homes included: rebuilding houses in different locations within the 
settlement because of unsuitable soil conditions for foundations (Indonesia); raising 
the ground floor slab of houses in flood prone areas (Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka); 
building houses on stilts (Thailand); ensuring robust earthquake resistant design and 
construction (Indonesia) and incorporating cyclone resistant features such as concrete 
roofs (India and Sri Lanka). 
In hot, humid climates minimising internal temperatures and ensuring adequate 
ventilation make a significant contribution to individual health and well-being.  
Across all four countries more than 60% of the households interviewed felt 
comfortable with the temperature inside their home but there were significant 
variations in house designs and levels of thermal comfort between countries.  In 
Indonesia overhanging eaves provided some shading to windows and walls, a 
ventilated pitched roof with ceiling reduced heat transmission through the roof while 
ventilation bricks were provided above windows and doors in each room.  Pitched 
roofs and ventilation bricks were also a feature of HFH’s core home design in Sri 
Lanka and while ceilings were not included to reduce heat transmission HFH staff 
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felt that sufficient ventilation was provided through gaps in the roof tiles.  HFH’s 
core homes in India typically had concrete walls and roofs with no insulation to 
reduce heat transmission into the house, limited shading of external windows or 
walls and little or no ventilation other than windows.  In contrast the lightweight 
construction of HFH Thailand’s core home – often raised on stilts – maximised the 
potential for ventilation through having several windows which either fully open or 
have glass louvres depending on the preference of the household.  
3.3 Access to services 
Communities in all four countries had high water tables and households typically 
sourced water from rivers or shallow wells.  In general HFH did not include the 
provision of water supplies in their tsunami-response programme because these were 
typically provided by government or other NGOs.  Notable exceptions are: Indonesia, 
where HFH provided water supply systems (either boreholes or water filtration) in 
six villages and established small committees to manage the systems and Thailand, 
where HFH partnered with another NGO to provide rainwater harvesting equipment 
(guttering and large ceramic pots) to some, but not all, households. 
HFH provided toilets to each household assisted in India, Sri Lanka and Indonesia; 
often to families who had not previously had access to improved sanitation at a 
household level.  In Thailand HFH's earlier projects did not include toilets as part of 
their core house design but these were included later projects and in the repayment 
programme many households had used their loan to build toilets and kitchen 
extensions onto their houses.   
The provision of improved sanitation was particularly successful in Sri Lanka where 
septic tanks met national standards and can be emptied by the local government.  
HFH also worked with public health inspectors to promote hygiene awareness and 
97% of households interviewed felt that their new facilities met their needs.  In 
contrast, HFH India provided leach pits with the toilets in some houses and in areas 
with high water tables these posed a potential source of ground water contamination.  
The assessment also noted that in some communities only women used the toilets.  In 
Indonesia water, sanitation and hygiene training was only provided in the six 
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communities where HFH had provided water supply systems and this left many 
communities unaware of the importance of using their new toilets with some families 
not understanding how to maintain them or how to empty their septic tanks once full. 
Consequently 37% of families interviewed were no longer using the bathrooms for a 
variety of reasons including leaks, closeness of the toilet to the living area and their 
preference to continue using traditional practices.   
While some of the sanitation challenges experienced in India and Indonesia were 
related to the physical design and construction of facilities they were primarily a 
result of programme design which did not adequately respond to communities’ 
existing knowledge, attitudes, and practices.  This highlights the importance of an 
integrated approach to water, sanitation and hygiene, with improvements in future 
programmes needed to ensure understanding at household level and a strategy for 
long-term operation and maintenance of the facilities provided. 
In India, Indonesia and Thailand HFH worked with the government to provide 
electricity connections to all HFH families; in India and Thailand only a few 
households had not previously had electricity connections, but in Indonesia this had 
increased coverage from 60 to 100% of the households interviewed.  In Sri Lanka the 
number of households with electricity connections had decreased from 21% before 
the tsunami to only 10% after the HFH programme.  HFH Sri Lanka struggled to find 
sites for relocation settlements with access to electricity and lack of clarity on land 
tenure for these communities further delayed the provision of electricity connections.  
In response to the challenge of providing mains grid electricity HFH Sri Lanka 
supported the use of solar technology.  48% of households interviewed understood 
and used solar energy for lighting and small appliances (compared to 31% before the 
tsunami). HFH Sri Lanka also introduced the use of solar cookers.  However the 
evaluation noted that solar technology was not fully understood by communities and 
further support was required for it to be fully successful. 
Although HFH’s tsunami-response housing programme did not specifically target 
fuel consumption, 10-25% of households interviewed in Indonesia, Thailand and 
India had stopped using wood or charcoal for cooking since the tsunami.  The 
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assessment did not directly investigate the reasons for this change in behaviour but 
households in India cited the new housing as an incentive to switch over to gas.  This 
may also be the case in Indonesia and Thailand, as HFH ‘homepartners’ typically 
expressed significant pride in their new houses, but it may also be attributed to raised 
environmental awareness (as a result of HFH’s gardening programmes), increased 
access to electricity (particularly in Indonesia) or improved living standards more 
generally as a result of HFH’s programme or the activities of government or other 
NGOs.  If attributable to the HFH housing programme this is potentially an 
important outcome as reduced use of wood or charcoal for cooking both reduces the 
use of local timber for fuel and improves indoor air quality, with long-term benefits 
to health. 
While HFH's programmes did not include the construction of educational facilities 
(except in isolated cases) 60-90% of the households interviewed felt that HFH's 
programme had increased access to education and this was reinforced in the 
interviews with community leaders.  Households cited various factors for this 
improvement including: increased disposable income to spend on uniforms/books 
(because of reduced spending on housing); better conditions for studying including 
private rooms for children and increased electric lighting; and increased motivation 
and a sense of well-being.  This was a significant positive finding of the assessment, 
despite the fact that some of the relocation communities did not have schools located 
within the community. 
4. Housing as a Process 
4.1 Community engagement 
HFH typically established a project management committee in each community 
which included beneficiaries, community representatives and local government 
officials.  Households and community leaders in all four countries felt that all 
sections of the community were able to participate in the project, that beneficiary 
selection criteria had been transparent and equitable, and that there was little 
corruption throughout the process.  However, 10-20% of households interviewed in 
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Indonesia and Sri Lanka did not find the HFH process easy to understand.  In 
Indonesia this was in communities where they spoke predominantly the local 
language of Acehnese, rather than Indonesian, and in Sri Lanka this was in migrant 
communities where the high mobility of individuals and families reduced effective 
community engagement. 
In several instances HFH targeted their assistance on the most vulnerable groups 
such as Morgan communities (Thailand), remote, lower caste, or migrant 
communities (Sri Lanka) and households with disabled family members (India).  
Households and community leaders in all four countries emphasised that the HFH 
programme had increased community cohesion through integrating vulnerable 
groups into society (India), increasing community spirit through providing ‘sweat 
equity’ on each other’s houses (Thailand) and bringing members of diverse religious 
groups to work together (Sri Lanka).  In Indonesia, where the cash for work 
programmes of other agencies had sometimes reduced the tradition of gotong royong 
(community self-help) (Thorburn 2007), this had been maintained in the 
communities where HFH worked, with communities working together to construct 
roads to enable materials to be delivered, cleaning drains etc. 
In theory HFH developed a standard core home design in each country to suit the 
local culture and climate and this was further adapted following consultation with 
specific communities or households.  In practice more than 70% of households 
interviewed reported being consulted regarding the location and design of their 
house; but it’s less clear if changes were made as a result of the consultation.  Many 
households commented that changes were not allowed as HFH had a standard house 
design while Arup ID’s evaluation of the programmes in India and Sri Lanka noted 
that they ‘are primarily driven by donor objectives and government guidelines’.  
Positive evidence of design changes made by HFH in response to household and 
community needs included adaptation of the core home design for the needs of 
fishing communities, households with a larger than average number of members, or 
those with disabled family members (India) and positioning of the toilet within the 
bathroom so that it was not orientated towards Mecca (Indonesia).  However, the 
possible limitations of the core home design and challenges experienced by HFH 
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introducing new construction materials and techniques, seismic detailing, sanitation 
and solar technologies suggest that the level of engagement might be considered 
‘consultation’ over minor details, rather than real ‘partnership’ in decision-making 
(Arnstein 1969) which built upon local knowledge, skills, attitudes and practices to 
co-develop appropriate designs. 
Very different approaches to community involvement in housing construction were 
taken across the four countries leading to diverse outcomes on the development of 
skills and employment opportunities:   
 There was very little involvement of beneficiaries in construction in India (either 
through ‘sweat equity’ or as paid labourers) with the majority of construction 
being undertaken by national contractors or international volunteers.  Although 
these fishing communities had not traditionally built their own houses, this was a 
missed opportunity for both short-term employment opportunities (while 
livelihoods were disrupted during recovery) and skills transfer to communities so 
that households could supervise paid labourers to maintain and extend their 
houses safely in the future. Very few households interviewed stated that the HFH 
programme had generated employment for communities or local suppliers at any 
point during or after the reconstruction process. 
 In Sri Lanka, few households could contribute ‘sweat equity’ during construction 
because they could not afford to take time away from their work but 45% of 
households interviewed took part as paid unskilled labourers.  Beneficiaries and 
community members also had significant involvement in the selection of material 
suppliers resulting in 38% of households interviewed feeling that the HFH 
programme had generated employment opportunities for local suppliers and 17% 
stating that it had provided continuing employment opportunities after the 
completion of the programme. 
 Construction in Indonesia was undertaken by professional labourers, sometimes 
from as far afield as Medan or Java because of the shortage of skilled labour 
closer to hand.  HFH encouraged communities to establish good relationships 
with their labourers and while the beneficiaries did not take part in construction 
directly they were responsible for monitoring the quality of materials and 
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workmanship on their own home.  This encouraged a high degree of ownership, 
but although HFH provided training for local supervisors (one per ten houses) the 
households interviewed felt that they had not had specific training on how to 
monitor the quality of construction.  As a result, by the time of the evaluation, 
households had already started to extend their houses without incorporating the 
key features of seismic resistant design. 
 HFH achieved the greatest involvement of communities in construction in 
Thailand. There both beneficiaries and other community members were involved 
in all aspects of construction and 24% of households interviewed also felt that it 
had benefited local suppliers.  The use of ‘sweat equity’ and international 
volunteers supported rather than competed with local labourers (as local capacity 
was exceeded in the aftermath of the tsunami) and households reported that 
working with international volunteers was a positive experience.  So much 
involvement of households and communities during construction had significant 
benefits for these communities.  Many learnt new skills during the process and of 
the households interviewed 90% felt that they had the skills and tools required to 
repair and maintain their home (compared with 30-50% in other countries). At 
the time of the assessment many households had begun supplementing their 
income through construction employment during the rainy season when they 
were unable to fish.  
HFH did not typically provide specific livelihood support programmes but 
sometimes: encouraged NGOs providing livelihood support to work in HFH 
communities (Thailand); partnered with other NGOs to provide livelihood training, 
tools or access to credit (Sri Lanka and India); or developed their own small-scale 
livelihood support programmes (Sri Lanka).  HFH's programmes in India, Sri Lanka 
and Indonesia often included the support of household or community gardening after 
the completion of the housing programme while some households in Indonesia had 
also used the opportunity of a new house to purchase land close to the road and 
invest in opening a small business or shop.  Despite localised instances of livelihood 
support, and some short-term benefits during the reconstruction programme the long-
term reliance on low paid employment, subject to seasonal or climatic disruption, 
remained a key concern of most communities visited in the assessment.  Thus, while 
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there were positive examples of livelihoods support to some communities through 
HFH's programmes, the lack of a systematic strategy to support livelihood 
development within these vulnerable coastal communities was a significant missed 
opportunity.  
Figure 4: Some households in Indonesia had chosen to re-locate within their community so that 
they could set up a small shop or cafe near to the road. 
 
4.2 Relationships with other actors 
A disaster on the scale of the tsunami required local and national governments to 
rapidly establish policy guidelines on eligibility criteria, reconstruction standards, 
land tenure etc.  HFH managed the risk of undertaking reconstruction programmes in 
a rapidly changing policy environment through close liaison with local government 
officials, government reconstruction agencies and other humanitarian organisations.  
HFH’s reconstruction programme in both Sri Lanka and Indonesia took place within 
complicated conflict or post-conflict situations.  In both instances HFH worked 
sensitively with the government, military and police (in addition to communities and 
partner NGOs) to ensure that HFH were aware of the security situation and that 
HFH’s programmes responded appropriately.  In all countries the Head of the Village, 
or Village Committee (elected local government representatives), was heavily 
involved in HFH’s programme.  Local government officials at a municipal or district 
level often attended project start or completion ceremonies to show their support and 
sometimes provided public health training, approved material suppliers, designs or 
construction quality.   
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HFH also worked closely with other NGOs working in the same communities, 
participated in knowledge exchange programmes, implemented programmes through 
partner NGOs (India) and partnered with specialist NGOs (for example in micro-
credit, provision of training or rainwater harvesting) when their skills were required 
(all countries).  HFH’s focus on working in partnership with communities, 
government and other NGOs meant that that a frequent finding from the assessment 
was that the project had improved linkages between the communities assisted and 
external actors.   
In many cases HFH also established positive relationships with material suppliers, 
labourers and larger contractors; supporting wider economic recovery during the 
reconstruction process.  This was particularly apparent in Indonesia where HFH: 
sourced materials locally whenever possible (with sand, aggregates and soil typically 
sourced from within the villages); ensured that all material suppliers were certified 
by local government (a potentially onerous requirement for small-scale suppliers, but 
HFH supported them through the process, which then made them eligible for other 
contracts once they had worked with HFH); supported capacity building in local 
suppliers (for example they developed a standard window design and then worked 
with local manufacturers to ensure that their products met the requirements of the 
specification).   
5. Conclusions 
Overall the assessment found that HFH’s housing reconstruction programmes after 
the Indian Ocean tsunami had made a significant contribution to the development of 
sustainable communities and livelihoods.  HFH’s housing programme had replaced 
houses which had been destroyed in the tsunami, often to a higher standard and (in 
most cases) complete with access to services and social infrastructure.  The provision 
of high quality core homes (physical assets) had reduced household vulnerability and 
increased the standard of living - with benefits to health and wellbeing (human 
assets) while HFH’s participatory process had increased community cohesion (social 
assets).  HFH’s programme had also contributed to the development of positive 
relationships between communities and a range of external actors (institutional 
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structures and processes) as well as supporting environmental and economic 
recovery (natural and financial assets) to a lesser extent. 
The following sections sumarise both the strengths of HFH’s tsunami-response 
programme and suggest areas for improvement in future programmes where small 
changes in programme design or implementation (at limited additional cost) could 
increase the long term impact of its work. 
5.1 Site selection and settlement planning 
HFH’s focus on in-situ reconstruction meant that households had maintained their 
access to existing social networks, employment opportunities and social 
infrastructure (social, economic and physical assets).  The physical assets of 
relocated communities were less vulnerable to natural hazards but households 
reported reduced access to education and employment opportunities as well as less 
community cohesion.  This highlights that if relocation has to occur after a disaster it 
must be viewed holistically; with sufficient infrastructure provided and adequate 
support for community and livelihood development.  A key area for improvement in 
HFH’s future housing programmes is to more broadly incorporate community-wide 
hazard assessment and settlement planning into their community engagement process 
(preferably linked to wider government planning policies) and include disaster risk 
reduction infrastructure and activities at a settlement level. 
5.2 House design and construction 
HFH’s policy to provide a simple core home that could later be extended enabled 
HFH to rapidly provide large numbers of permanent houses.  The design of HFH’s 
core home enabled people to easily adapt or extend their houses, but the fact that 
many households had made similar changes to their houses soon after completion, 
may also indicate the limitations of the original core home design.  HFH’s 
commitment to negotiating tenure security for each household was a significant 
benefit of the HFH programme, as was the incorporation of household-level hazard 
assessment and mitigation.  However, greater emphasis could have been placed on 
climatically appropriate design.  In several instances HFH introduced new 
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construction materials or techniques, and while these examples show the organisation 
striving to innovate, this assessment found that these were easiest for households and 
labourers to understand and replicate themselves when they were incremental 
improvements on existing techniques.   
5.3 Access to services 
Water supplies were typically reinstated by other actors but HFH provided toilets for 
each household.  While the provision of toilets was a positive aspect of HFH’s 
programme, many families had not previously had access to improved sanitation and 
did not understand the importance of using their new toilets or know how to maintain 
them in the future.  This highlights the importance of an integrated approach to water, 
sanitation and hygiene, with improvements in future programmes needed to ensure 
understanding at household level and a strategy for operation and maintenance of the 
facilities provided.  Similar challenges with household understanding, acceptance 
and maintenance of new technologies were experienced where HFH introduced solar 
technologies to communities without access to mains grid electricity.  HFH’s 
programme also resulted in indirect benefits such as improved levels education as 
result of greater disposable income, private areas for children to study with electric 
lighting and increased motivation and well-being.  The programme may have also 
contributed to decreased use of timber and charcoal as fuel; both reducing the use of 
local timber for fuel and improving indoor air quality, with long-term benefits to 
health. 
5.4 Community engagement 
HFH’s community engagement process had significant benefits in terms of increased 
community cohesion (social assets).  However, the limitations of the core home 
design and challenges experienced by HFH introducing new construction materials, 
seismic detailing, sanitation and solar technologies indicate that greater participation 
in decision-making (such as selection of construction materials and technologies) is 
required to ensure HFH’s programmes meet the needs of the communities they 
intend to support.  The assessment found that the more households and communities 
were involved during construction the greater the benefits in terms of livelihood 
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diversification and equipping communities with the knowledge and skills to 
adequately maintain, adapt and extend their houses.  It also highlighted that 
opportunities for employment generation during construction (in material supply or 
construction labour) were missed in many of HFH’s programmes suggesting the need 
for a more holistic approach to livelihood support and diversification at household, 
community and sector level.   
5.5 Relationships with other actors 
HFH developed positive working relationships with a range of external actors in 
challenging situations – although partnerships with academic institutions were 
notably lacking.  HFH’s focus on working in partnership with communities, 
government and other NGOs meant that the project had improved linkages between 
communities’ and external actors and developed a more supportive enabling 
environment.  In many cases HFH also established positive relationships with 
material suppliers, labourers and larger contractors; supporting wider economic 
recovery during the reconstruction process and enabling HFH to scale-up their 
programmes through cost-sharing arrangements.  While many of these partnerships 
were successful this assessment suggests that there is greater potential for 
partnerships in future reconstruction programmes to complement HFH’s experience 
in housing construction with the specialist expertise of other actors to address some 
of the challenges raised in this assessment and maximise the impact of its work. 
6. Recommendations 
Every disaster response operation poses unique challenges as humanitarian 
organisations strive to support the unique needs of individuals, families and 
communities in different geographical, climatic, cultural and political contexts.  
Prescriptive recommendations for future programmes (such as ‘use vernacular 
materials’ or ‘avoid relocation’) are therefore less useful than approaches which can 
be adopted in any context.  Based on this assessment the authors propose the 
following recommendations for HFH’s future disaster-response operations: 
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 the need for greater participation in decision-making throughout project design, 
construction, maintenance and replication to ensure that programmes really meet 
the needs of the families and communities they intend to serve; 
 the importance of considering the long-term use of houses, infrastructure, 
construction materials, techniques or technologies from the outset.  Will families 
be able to maintain, adapt, extend or replicate any new interventions themselves? 
 the need for greater consideration of settlements in addition to houses to reduce 
risk and ensure that it is not just houses which are rebuilt but communities – 
complete with spaces for education, healthcare, livelihoods and recreation. 
 the importance of a holistic approach – maximising the contribution of all 
humanitarian interventions to social, economic, environmental, cultural and 
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